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A History | The American Revolution: First Phase | Formation of the Continental Army
Formation of the Continental Army
The response of George III and his ministers to the events
at Lexington, Concord, and
Bunker Hill was a determined effort to subdue the rebellious colonists by force. It took time to mount
this effort, and after Bunker Hill the Americans enjoyed a respite lasting almost a year. During most of
this period the Second Continental Congress, though forced by
events in New England to take on itself the leadership of an armed revolt, proceeded hesitantly, still
seeking a formula for reconciliation that would preserve American rights. Military preparations were
designed for a short struggle, to endure no longer than the end of the year 1776. Nevertheless the
Americans took advantage of the respite to create a national army, to consolidate their hold on the
governmental machinery throughout the thirteen colonies, to invade Canada, and finally to force the British
to evacuate Boston.
The creation of a Continental Army was in the long run perhaps their
most significant achievement. Some time before Bunker Hill the Massachusetts Provincial Congress, aware of
the necessity of enlisting the support of all the colonies in the struggle against the British, appealed to
the Continental Congress to adopt the New England army. Although there is no formal record of the action,
Congress evidently did vote to adopt it on June 14, 1775the accepted birthday of the U.S. Army. On the same
day it voted to raise ten companies of riflementhe first soldiers to be enlisted directly in the Continental
servicein Pennsylvania, Maryland, and Virginia, to march north to join the army before Boston.
The next day, June 15, Congress chose George Washington, a Virginian, to
be Commander in Chief. The choice was made for geographical and political as much as for military reasons.
The New Englanders felt that in order to enlist the support of the southern colonies, a southerner should be
chosen for the post of command. Washington's military experience was perhaps greater than that of any other
southerner, and he came from the largest and most important of the southern colonies. His impressive
appearance, quiet and confident manner, and good work in the military committees of Congress had impressed
all.
The choice proved fortunate. Washington himself recognized, when he accepted the command, that he lacked
the requisite experience and knowledge in handling large bodies of men. His whole military experience had
been in frontier warfare during the French and Indian War. But
experience as a political leader in his native Virginia and in directing the business affairs of his large
plantation at Mount Vernon also stood him in good stead. He brought to the task traits of character and
abilities as a leader that in the end more than compensated for his lack of professional military experience.
Among these qualities were a determination and a steadfastness of purpose rooted in an unshakable conviction
of the righteousness of the American cause, a scrupulous sense of honor and duty, and a dignity that inspired
respect and confidence in those around him. Conscious of his own defects, he was always willing to profit by
experience. From the trials and tribulations of eight years of war he was to learn the essentials of strategy,
tactics, and military organization.
Congress also appointed four major generals and eight brigadiers to serve under Washington, set up a series
of staff offices closely resembling those in the British Army, prescribed a pay scale and standard ration,
and adopted Articles of War to govern the military establishment. The same mixture of geographical, political,
and military considerations governed the choice of Washington's subordinates. Two-thirds of them came from
New England, in recognition of the fact that the existing army was a New England army. Three
others Charles Lee, Horatio Gates, and Richard
Montgomery were chosen because of their experience in the British Army. Lee, in particular, who had come from
England to the colonies in 1773, was in 1775 deemed the foremost military expert in America, and he was for
a time to be Washington's first assistant.
The army of which Washington formally took command on July 3, 1775, he described as "a mixed multitude
of people . . . under very little discipline, order or government." Out of this "mixed multitude," Washington set out to create an army shaped in large part in the British image. Basing his observations on his experience with British Regulars during the French and Indian War, he wrote: "Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable;
procures success to the weak and esteem to all." Employing Gates, his experienced adjutant general, to
prepare regulations and orders, the Commander in Chief set out to inculcate discipline. A strenuous effort
was made to halt the random comings and goings of officers and men and to institute regular roll calls and
strength returns. Suspicious of the "leveling" tendencies of the New Englanders, Washington made
the distinction between officers and enlisted men more rigid. Various punishments were introducedlash,
pillory, wooden horse, and drumming out of campand courts-martial sat almost constantly.
While establishing discipline in the existing army, Washington had at the same time to form a new one
enlisted directly in the Continental service. Out of conferences with a Congressional committee that
visited camp in September 1775 emerged a plan for such an army, composed of 26 regiments of infantry of 728
men each, plus one regiment of riflemen and one of artillery, 20,372 men in all, to be uniformly paid,
supplied, and administered by the Continental Congress and enlisted to the end of the year 1776. Except
for the short term of enlistment, it was an excellent plan on paper, but Washington soon found he could not
carry it out. Both officers and men resisted a reorganization that cut across the lines of the locally
organized units in which they were accustomed to serve. The men saw as their first obligation their families
and farms at home, and they were reluctant to re-enlist for another year's service. On December 10th, despite
pressures and patriotic appeals, most of the Connecticut men went home and militia from New Hampshire and
Massachusetts had to be brought in to fill their places in the line. Others, who had jeered and hooted when
the Connecticut men left, also went home when their enlistment expired only three weeks later.
On January 1, 1776, when the army became "Continental in every respect," Washington found that he
had only slightly more than 8,000 enlistments instead of the 20,000 planned. Returns in early March showed
only a thousand or so more. "I have often thought how much happier I would have been," wrote a
sorely tried commander, "if, instead of accepting a command under such circumstances, I had taken up
musket on my shoulder and entered the ranks, or, if I could have justified the measure to posterity and
my own conscience, had retired to the back country and lived in a Wigwam."
With enlistments falling short, the only recourse was to continue to use short-term militia to fill the
gaps in the lines. A Continental Army had been formed, but it fell far short of the goals Washington and
Congress had set for it. This army was enlisted for but a year and the whole troublesome process would
have to be repeated at the end of 1776. The short term of enlistment was, of course, a cardinal error,
but in 1775 everyone, including Washington, anticipated only a short campaign.
While organizing and disciplining his army, Washington had also to maintain the siege of Boston and overcome
his deficiencies in supply. In these efforts he was more successful. Congress and the individual colonies
sponsored voyages to the West Indies, where the French and Dutch had conveniently exported quantities of
war materials. Washington put some of his troops on board ship and with an improvised navy succeeded in
capturing numerous British supply ships. He sent Col. Henry Knox, later to be
his Chief of Artillery, to Ticonderoga, and Knox in the winter
of 1775-76 brought some fifty pieces of captured cannon to Cambridge over poor or nonexistent roads in
icebound New York and New England. By March 1776, despite deficiencies in the number of Continentals,
Washington was ready to close in on Boston.
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